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NICKELS AND DIMES? RETHINKING THE
IMPOSITION OF SPECIAL ASSESSMENT FEES ON
INDIGENT DEFENDANTS*
NDJUOH MEHCHU**
The Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution bars the imposition of
“excessive fines.” Despite this seemingly straightforward mandate, case law is
not harmonious on the meaning of “excessive” under the Eighth Amendment.
Significant questions persist as to whether imposing an economic sanction on a
defendant that lacks any ability to pay is incongruous with the Amendment’s
prohibition on excessive fines. Although the relevance of the “ability to pay”
question to the excessiveness inquiry was acknowledged by the Supreme Court
in the 2019 case Timbs v. Indiana, the Court left the resolution of the question
for another day. This Article laments the Court’s decision to pass on this
examination. It does so by analyzing the imposition of special assessment fees on
indigent criminal defendants, an aspect of sentencing that has received
remarkably little attention from legal scholars and practitioners.
The starting point is an overview of the special assessment fee structure and how
it compares to other economic sanctions imposed in the criminal legal system.
When a defendant is sentenced, no fine is imposed if the judge determines that
the defendant lacks the ability to pay any fine. In such circumstances, explicit in
the judge’s determination is that the defendant is too poor to pay any amount of
money. But the current special assessment fee structure requires every individual
defendant to pay a $100 special assessment fee for each count of conviction on a
federal crime, even if the judge has already determined that the defendant is too
poor to pay an accompanying fine. Because many Americans cannot relate to
the jeopardy of being unable to pay a $100 fee, it is taken for granted that
individual defendants who cannot pay any amount of money should somehow
be able to pay this amount. This thinking not only defies logic, it also ignores the
reality that for people wrapped in the iron grip of poverty, even “small” legal
financial obligations (“LFOs”) can have devastating consequences that trickle
down to families and communities. The current special assessment scheme is also
defective because it overlooks the administrative burdens of overseeing LFOs
that will not be collected.

* © 2021 Ndjuoh MehChu.
** Associate Professor, Seton Hall University School of Law. Thanks to Lekan Sumono and
Rachel A. Jacob for terrific research aid. Meredith Lewis and a fantastic team of North Carolina Law
Review editors offered insightful comments and edits for which I am grateful. All errors are mine.
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With the consequences of these deficiencies in mind, this Article suggests a
straightforward but overlooked reform to the special assessment scheme. It argues
that a sentencing court should be permitted to, and ought to, waive the
imposition of a special assessment fee if the court has already determined that a
defendant is unable to pay any amount of money. At best, when a defendant’s
financial situation forecloses any payment, the status quo special assessment
scheme is an administrative inefficiency because of the costs of overseeing LFOs.
And at worst, it may violate the defendant’s Eighth Amendment protections
against excessive fines.
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INTRODUCTION
In criminal cases poor people lose most of the time, not because indigent
defense is inadequately funded, although it is, and not because defense
attorneys for poor people are ineffective, although some are. Poor people
lose, most of the time, because in American criminal justice, poor people
are losers.
—Paul Butler1
The coronavirus (“COVID-19”) pandemic has laid bare the financial
vulnerability of many Americans. In the communities most devastated by
COVID-19, the problems are not confined to mourning the loss of life.2 Instead,
the challenges run in several different directions. Basic necessities are a primary
concern.3 Families are going hungry4 and struggling to keep the lights on.5 An
unprecedented eviction crisis has left its mark.6 Viewing the economic strife
through the prism of the global experience with the crisis, it is fair to say that
the United States bungled the economic response to the virus.7 But while the

1. Paul D. Butler, Poor People Lose: Gideon and the Critique of Rights, 122 YALE L.J. 2176, 2178
(2013).
2. Annie Correal & Andrew Jacobs, ‘A Tragedy Is Unfolding’: Inside New York’s Virus Epicenter,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/09/nyregion/coronavirus-queenscorona-jackson-heights-elmhurst.html [https://perma.cc/MGA6-5T3B (dark archive)] (last updated
Aug. 5, 2020).
3. Id. (“In the meantime, the needs of the living keep growing. Thousands have lost jobs, and
the undocumented have so far been excluded from federal government aid.”); see also Annie Gasparro
& Jaewon Kang, From Flour to Canned Soup, Coronavirus Surge Pressures Food Supplies, WALL ST. J. (July
12, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/coronavirus-surge-challenges-struggling-food-supply-chains11594546200 [https://perma.cc/THX3-5TG5].
4. Francesca Giuliani-Hoffman, The Hunger Crisis Linked to Coronavirus Could Kill More People
than the Disease Itself, Oxfam Warns, CNN (July 12, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/07/12/us/hungercrisis-deaths-coronavirus-oxfam-trnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/VU7D-HCBQ].
5. Anna Bahney, What To Do if You’re Worried About Paying Your Bills, CNN (Mar. 22,
2020, 2:56 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/03/22/success/cannot-pay-bills-coronavirus/index.html
[https://perma.cc/C5SD-JUSW].
6. Matthew Haag, A Moratorium on Eviction Ends, Leaving Thousands of Tenants Fearful, N.Y.
TIMES (June 22, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/22/nyregion/nyc-evictions-moratoriumcoronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/PG9F-ENDS (dark archive)] (last updated May 4, 2020).
7. It is perhaps easiest to assess the shortcomings by comparing the economic relief the United
States has provided to Americans during the pandemic to how other nations have dealt with the
economic fallout. By this measure, the nation’s response leaves a lot to be desired. See Daniel Villarreal,
Here’s How U.S. Coronavirus Stimulus Package Compares to Other Countries Around the
World, NEWSWEEK (Apr. 10, 2020, 9:15 PM), https://www.newsweek.com/heres-how-us-coronavirusstimulus-package-compares-other-countries-around-world-1497360 [https://perma.cc/S8J4-C8UV]
(“Australia’s stimulus package allows furloughed employees to receive $1,500 AUD ($996.65 USD)
every two weeks . . . Britain’s government is issuing grants covering 80 percent of unemployed workers’
salaries up to a total of £2,500 ($3,084) a month . . . . Canada will give $2,000 CAD ($1,433 USD) each
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pandemic put a microscope on the nation’s flawed policies toward the indigent,
it would be a mistake to think that these inadequacies are limited to short-term
pandemic responses. Indeed, they stretch into nearly every American
institution.8 On this account, those who are poor and justice-involved are caught
in a double bind. The following example illustrates this predicament.
Sixteen-year-old Kalief Browder was detained on a $3,000 bail at Rikers
Island.9 Because he was too poor to post bail, he languished for three years in
jail without trial—nearly two of those in solitary confinement.10 His alleged
offense? Stealing a backpack.11 Kalief was released after the prosecution failed
to find any evidence to support his detainment.12 It has now been more than six
years since he hung himself at his parents’ home with an air conditioner cord.13
The incalculable tragedy of Kalief’s story is a painful reminder of how the
treatment of the indigent in the criminal legal system in the United States
cannot be harmonized with elemental notions of justice.14
Indeed, surveying the landscape of the criminal legal system, it is readily
apparent that laws and policies are routinely adopted and enforced in ways that
do not augur well for the constitutional rights of the indigent.15 Although the
Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that “excessive fines”
month for up to four months to those who’ve lost jobs due to the epidemic . . . . France will pay 70
percent of an employee’s gross salary to a monthly maximum of €6,927 ($7,575 USD).”).
8. See, e.g., Sasha Abramsky, America’s Shameful Poverty Stats, NATION (Sept. 18,
2013), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/americas-shameful-poverty-stats/ [https://perma.cc
/A4QM-FC7Q (dark archive)].
9. Udi Ofer, Kalief Browder’s Tragic Death and the Criminal Injustice of Our Bail System, ACLU
(Mar. 15, 2017, 2:45 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/smart-justice/kalief-browders-tragic-death-andcriminal-injustice-our-bail-system [https://perma.cc/9X2A-ZDYQ]; see also Ted Alcorn, Jail or Bail?
There’s a New Option, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/01/nyregion/
rikers-supervised-release-bail.html [https://perma.cc/2N7Z-NUFB (dark archive)] (“16-year-old
[Kalief Browder] . . . became the face of pretrial reform, was held on Rikers for three years for allegedly
swiping a backpack, all the while maintaining his innocence, before prosecutors ultimately dropped the
charges for lack of evidence.”).
10. Michael Schwirtz & Michael Winerip, Kalief Browder, Held at Rikers Island for 3 Years Without
Trial, Commits Suicide, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/09/nyregion/
kalief-browder-held-at-rikers-island-for-3-years-without-trial-commits-suicide.html [https://perma.cc
/A5GZ-4LYZ (dark archive)].
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Ofer, supra note 9.
14. Colleen Long & Hannah Fingerhut, AP-NORC Poll, Nearly All in U.S. Back Criminal Justice
Reform, ASSOCIATED PRESS (June 23, 2020), https://apnews.com/ffaa4bc564afcf4a90b02f455d8fdf03
[https://perma.cc/DBX2-AQZ6] (“[N]early all Americans favor at least some level of change to the
nation’s criminal justice system.”); 91 Percent of Americans Support Criminal Justice Reform, ACLU Polling
Finds, ACLU (Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/91-percent-americans-supportcriminal-justice-reform-aclu-polling-finds [https://perma.cc/M9X3-HJBY].
15. US: Criminal Justice System Fuels Poverty Cycle, HUM. RTS. WATCH (June 21, 2018, 4:00
PM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/06/21/us-criminal-justice-system-fuels-poverty-cycle# [https://
perma.cc/ELK4-3AAQ] (“[A]uthorities should not rely on fines and fees to pay for government
programs because they disproportionally hurt the poor.”).
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shall not be “imposed,”16 this constitutional mandate appears to be no more than
advisory when indigent defendants are concerned. This Article suggests one
straightforward but underappreciated way policymakers can shore up
constitutional protections for the most financially vulnerable defendants. It
diverges from past scholarship in that it is the first Article to undertake a
sustained analysis of special assessments within the context of the Excessive
Fines Clause.17
What are special assessments? Special assessments are statutorily
mandated fees imposed as part of a defendant’s sentence.18 The fees are used to
finance crime victims’ funds.19 When a defendant is sentenced on a felony
conviction, no criminal fine20 is imposed if the court determines that the
defendant is unable to pay one.21 But despite such a determination, the judge is
statutorily required to impose a $100 special assessment fee for each count of
conviction.22 Therefore, if the defendant is convicted on ten felony counts, a
$1,000 special assessment fee is statutorily mandated, even though the court has
already determined that the defendant’s financial situation forecloses any
payment.
This Article argues for a rethinking of the special assessment scheme.
Specifically, this Article demonstrates that the special assessment scheme
should be recalibrated to allow judges to waive the imposition of special
assessment fees. The argument comes in three parts. Part I provides background
on the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause, describing how the
Supreme Court has interpreted the meaning of the terms “fine” and “excessive”
within the scope of the Amendment. It explains that from the very beginning
16. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
17. The writings on the Excessive Fines Clause tend to focus on forfeitures and restitution.
Special assessments are largely ignored in the literature. See, e.g., Beth A. Colgan, The Excessive Fines
Clause: Challenging the Modern Debtors’ Prison 65 UCLA L. REV. 2, 2 (2018) [hereinafter Colgan,
Challenging the Modern Debtors’ Prison] (discussing forfeitures and restitution but not covering special
assessments); Beth A. Colgan, Reviving the Excessive Fines Clause, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 277, 277 (2014)
[hereinafter Colgan, Reviving the Excessive Fines Clause] (same); Beth A. Colgan, Graduating Economic
Sanctions According to Ability To Pay, 103 IOWA L. REV. 53, 53 (2017) [hereinafter Colgan, Graduating
Economic Sanctions] (same); Nicholas M. McLean, Livelihood, Ability To Pay, and the Original Meaning
of the Excessive Fines Clause, 40 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 833, 833, 849–50 (2013) (same); Kevin
Bennardo, Restitution and the Excessive Fines Clause, 77 LA. L. REV. 21, 21 (2016) (same).
18. 18 U.S.C. § 3013.
19. 34 U.S.C. § 20101(b)(2).
20. Economic sanctions in the criminal legal system that are punitive are generally grouped under
the label of fines. But fines are also a specific class of economic sanctions—distinct from restitution,
forfeitures, and special assessments—“imposed as a penalty after a criminal conviction or admission of
guilt to a civil infraction.” CRIM. JUST. POL’Y PROGRAM, HARVARD L. SCH., CONFRONTING
CRIMINAL
JUSTICE
DEBT:
A
GUIDE
FOR
POLICY
REFORM
6
(2016),
https://cjdebtreform.org/sites/criminaldebt/themes/debtor/blob/Confronting-Crim-Justice-DebtGuide-to-Policy-Reform.pdf [https://perma.cc/BUN4-QZVE].
21. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5E1.2(a) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
22. 18 U.S.C. § 3013.
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when the Eighth Amendment was ratified, there has been ambiguity as to the
meaning of the terms, particularly regarding what constitutes excessive.23
Regrettably, the Court has yet to rule on whether a defendant’s ability to pay is
relevant in determining the excessiveness of a fine, passing on this decision as
recently as 2019 in Timbs v. Indiana.24 As a consequence of the narrow
interpretative boundaries of the excessiveness inquiry, the Court has failed to
guard against yet another dimension of the injustices that befall poor people in
the criminal legal system.25 Failing to adopt an “ability to pay” test
disadvantages the poorest defendants and erodes any notion of fair sentencing
because it ignores the reality that for offenders of equal blameworthiness, a fixed
fine inflicts a harsher punishment on those who are more financially insecure.
Indeed, indigent defendants often face legal financial obligations (“LFOs”)26
that may appear insignificant to a wealthy person (i.e., $100) but that would in
practice deprive the poor of their livelihoods.
In light of that reality, Part II focuses its attention on special assessment
fees. It begins by sketching the historical context in which special assessment
fees were established, explaining that their provenance is tied to the victims’
rights movement that emerged in the aftermath of the sensationalized violence
of the 1960s civil rights revolution and peaked in the “tough on crime” era of
mass incarceration in the mid-1980s. Through this examination, the Article
historicizes the special assessment scheme as an artifact of a period where
criminal law was guided primarily by the belief that punishing individuals to
the harshest extent of the law was in the interest of “justice.” But these beliefs
no longer reflect prevailing understandings of crime and punishment.27 Some
aspects of the special assessment statute itself seem outmoded with the clarity
23. See Colgan, Reviving the Excessive Fines Clause, supra note 17, at 321 (explaining that
“subsequent provisions of the Magna Carta [the Eighth Amendment’s predecessor] underscore the
importance of [the] proportionality requirement,” which contemplate specifically that “defendants not
be ruined by fines—that their ability to maintain a livelihood be saved”).
24. 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019).
25. See Kaaryn Gustafson, The Criminalization of Poverty, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643,
643 (2009) (examining the interconnectedness between the American welfare system and criminal legal
system, and finding that in courts, the “poor have been relegated to an inferior status of rights-bearing
citizenship, a status on par with parolees and probationers”); see also Butler, supra note 1, at 2178 (“In
criminal cases poor people lose most of the time, not because indigent defense is inadequately funded,
although it is, and not because defense attorneys for poor people are ineffective, although some are.
Poor people lose, most of the time, because in American criminal justice, poor people are losers. Prison
is designed for them.”).
26. Criminal justice debt, also known as legal financial obligations (“LFOs”), refers to any debt
accrued as a result of criminal justice involvement. For comprehensive coverage on the types of criminal
justice debt, see generally Neil L. Sobol, Charging the Poor: Criminal Justice Debt & Modern-Day Debtors’
Prisons, 75 MD. L. REV. 486 (2016).
27. Megan Brenan, Fewer Americans Call for Tougher Criminal Justice System, GALLUP
(Nov. 16, 2020), https://news.gallup.com/poll/324164/fewer-americans-call-tougher-criminal-justicesystem.aspx [https://perma.cc/GQ5G-ULP2] (“Americans’ belief that the U.S. criminal justice system
is ‘not tough enough’ on crime is now half of what it was in Gallup’s initial reading of 83% in 1992.”).
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of hindsight. To provide background on these statutory defects, Part II then
turns to the particularities of the special assessment statute and situates the
special assessment scheme relative to other economic sanctions that are imposed
after a criminal defendant is convicted: fines, restitutions, and forfeitures.
Part III laments the Court’s failure to adopt an ability-to-pay test in
determining whether an economic sanction is a constitutional impropriety
under the Eighth Amendment. It begins by defending the threshold claim that
special assessments are economic sanctions that should be considered “fines”
under the Excessive Fines Clause. Part III then argues that special assessments
fall comfortably within the meaning of fines for purposes of the Clause. The
criteria are met for several reasons. One reason is because, like forfeitures and
criminal fines, which are both nominally titled “fines” within the meaning of
the Clause, special assessments are imposed by the government following
conviction of a crime. Additionally, special assessment fees are statutorily
mandated to be collected in the same manner as criminal fines.28
With this foundation in place, Part III makes the case that the special
assessment penalty scheme is in tension with current sentencing decisions
involving the financial condition of criminal defendants. Judges routinely make
evaluations about defendants, including their ability to satisfy legal financial
obligations.29 When a judge determines that a defendant lacks the ability to pay
a fine, the judge’s assessment will explicitly find that the defendant is too poor
to pay any amount of money. Yet, in cases where the judge has already deemed the
defendant incapable of paying any amount of money, the special assessment
scheme is an administrative layer that can only be waived by the U.S. Attorney
present at sentencing.30 Compounding the problem, prosecutors rarely move
for the judge to take such action.31 As a result, many criminal defendants wind
up with unmanageable LFOs even though the court has already determined that
they cannot pay any amount of money.
With due attention to these considerations, this Article proposes that
when a sentencing court has decided against imposing any fine on the theory
that a defendant is unable to pay one, the court should be permitted to, and
28. Referring to special assessment fees, 18 U.S.C. § 3013(b) states that “[s]uch amount so
assessed shall be collected in the manner that fines are collected in criminal cases.”
29. See, e.g., United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 151 (1997) (noting “the longstanding principle
that sentencing courts have broad discretion to consider various kinds of information”); Payne v.
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 820–21 (1991) (“[T]he sentencing authority has always been free to consider
a wide range of relevant material.”); United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972) (“[B]efore
[determining what sentence to impose], a judge may appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope,
largely unlimited either as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source from which it may
come.”).
30. See 18 U.S.C. § 3573.
31. The basis of this conclusion is a study conducted by this author involving 112 federal criminal
cases across the country where defendants were deemed at sentencing to be poor to pay a fine. See infra
Appendix.
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should, waive the special assessment on its own accord. On this view, whether
a special assessment fee is waived would not depend on the prosecution’s
motion. In contrast to the current special assessment scheme, the proposed
reform would advance the interests of the court by recognizing and affirming
judges’ sentencing discretion, protecting indigent defendants against
unmanageable criminal justice debt, and reducing the costs to the government
of overseeing criminal justice debt that is unlikely to be collected. With respect
to victims, there is clearly no benefit to imposing a fee that cannot actually be
collected and transferred to victims. Instead, this Article suggests the obligation
to pay the special assessment fee can be profitably converted to an obligation to
perform community service that will benefit the population harmed by the
defendant’s criminal conduct.
Part III ends by exploring the likely objections against the proposal. To
give just one example, commentators advance arguments to the effect that
waiving the imposition of special assessment fees on indigent defendants would
under-deter the poor.32 This argument has roots in the Aristotelian notion of
corrective justice, which says that “sanctions should be based on the wrong done
rather than on the status of the defendant; a person is punished for what he
does, not for who he is . . . .”33 To accept this argument is first to ignore that
wealthy people who commit crimes usually receive lower sentences than poor
people who commit the same offense in part because wealthy people have the
resources to afford better representation.34 Thus, while there may be legitimate
policy reasons for conditioning punishment solely on the gravity of the offense,
we should not ignore the reality that much of how society punishes individuals
is based on the individual, not the crime.
Moreover, the under-deterrence theory also overlooks that people in dire
financial straits who commit crimes typically do not vary their conduct based
on the likelihood that they will be subjected to financial consequences.35 The
32. Alec Schierenbeck, The Constitutionality of Income-Based Fines, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 1869, 1882
(2018) (explaining that critiques of income-based fines often rail against such schemes on the ground
that they will under-deter the poor).
33. Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2003).
34. Adam J. Kolber, The Subjective Experience of Punishment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 182, 232 (2009).
35. See Torie Atkinson, A Fine Scheme: How Municipal Fines Become Crushing Debt in the Shadow
of the New Debtors’ Prisons, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 189, 237 (2016) (“The indigent cannot be
deterred from ‘crimes’ that they must commit because of their poverty, particularly the crime of not
paying a fine or fee.”); see also Katherine Beckett & Alexes Harris, On Cash and Conviction: Monetary
Sanctions as Misguided Policy, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 505, 506 (2011) (“For a penalty to
effectively deter wrong-doing, its consequences must be known to potential offenders as they
contemplate their options; swiftness and certainty are key. But the assessment of monetary sanctions
is characterized by neither swiftness nor certainty.”); Hannah Turner, The Price of Freedom: An Analysis
of Monetary Sanctions in the United States, CLASSIC J. (2019), http://theclassicjournal.uga.edu/
index.php/2019/02/06/the-price-of-freedom-an-analysis-of-monetary-sanctions-in-the-united-states/
[https://perma.cc/L37Y-SQAB].
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reason is because facing abject poverty is like living in a burning building. When
the fire starts, fleeing takes over the mind; cost-benefit analyses do not play a
prominent role in the deliberations.36 Whatever route might lead to escape
becomes attractive, regardless of what awaits on the other side. As the
inimitable James Baldwin related the interplay of deterrence and severe
hardship, “[i]f one is continually surviving the worst that life can bring, one
eventually ceases to be controlled by a fear of what life can bring; whatever it
brings must be borne.”37
I. THE SUPREME COURT’S EXCESSIVE FINES JURISPRUDENCE
To promote equality in sentencing and alleviate the corrosive effects of
poverty, we must bear in mind that “$10 doesn’t sound like a lot, but it is a lot
when you’re living on $300 a month.”38 Because many Americans—especially
those in positions of power responsible for crafting criminal law and trying or
adjudicating defendants—cannot fathom such economic hardship, the realities
of the financial strife faced by the most indigent are often overlooked. But the
situation just described sums up a common predicament for millions in the
United States who are wrapped in the iron grip of poverty39 and the criminal
legal system. This part covers the doctrinal preliminaries of the Excessive Fines
Clause, which the framers of the Eighth Amendment had hoped would save the
poor from ruin.
A.

The Excessive Fines Clause and the Meaning of “Fines”

The Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution provides that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted.”40 The first Supreme
Court case examining the Clause was Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc.
v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,41 involving a dispute related to waste disposal businesses

36. See Atkinson, supra note 35, at 237.
37. JAMES BALDWIN, THE FIRE NEXT TIME 106 (1963).
38. See KATHERINE A. BECKETT, ALEXES M. HARRIS & HEATHER EVANS, WASH. STATE
MINORITY & JUST. COMM’N, THE ASSESSMENT AND CONSEQUENCES OF LEGAL OBLIGATIONS
IN WASHINGTON STATE 42 (2008) [hereinafter BECKETT ET AL., CONSEQUENCES OF LFOS],
https://media.spokesman.com/documents/2009/05/study_LFOimpact.pdf [https://perma.cc/RAT9KSQE].
39. Pam Fessler, U.S. Census Bureau Reports Poverty Rate Down, but Millions Still Poor, NPR (Sept.
10, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/09/10/759512938/u-s-census-bureau-reports-poverty-rate-downbut-millions-still-poor [https://perma.cc/SFH5-MXU6] (“Despite the decline in poverty, the Census
Bureau found that 38.1 million people in 2018 were poor. This was 1.4 million fewer poor people than
in 2017, but about one in eight Americans still lived below the poverty line—$25,465 for a family with
two adults and two children.”).
40. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (emphasis added).
41. 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
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in Burlington, Vermont.42 Rejecting the claim that punitive damages awards in
civil cases between private parties were “fines” within the meaning of the
Excessive Fines Clause, the Court held that “the Excessive Fines Clause was
intended to limit only those fines directly imposed by, and payable to, the
government.”43 The Court’s conclusion was anchored by the evolution of the
Eighth Amendment, specifically the “purposes and concerns”44 of the
Amendment “as illuminated by its history.”45
To begin with, the Court reasoned that the Eighth Amendment “clearly
was adopted with the particular intent of placing limits on the powers of the
new Government.”46 It then observed that the Eighth Amendment was modeled
on a provision of the English Bill of Rights of 1689 that was adopted to restrain
government excesses.47 That provision of the English Bill of Rights provided,
in relevant part: “[E]xcessive Baile ought not to be required nor excessive Fines
imposed nor cruell and unusuall Punishments inflicted.”48 From these insights the
Court concluded that, in the context of the Excessive Fines Clause, “the word
‘fine’ was understood to mean a payment to a sovereign as punishment for some
offense.”49 The ruling greatly narrowed the types of monetary sanctions that
would be considered “fines” under the Eighth Amendment.50
Given this background, one might understandably read Browning-Ferris as
effectively cabining the meaning of “fines” under the Eighth Amendment to
include only economic sanctions arising from criminal cases. But the Court in
Austin v. United States51 made clear that the definition is more capacious. In
Austin, the defendant Richard Lyle Austin was arrested after a search warrant
executed on his autobody business revealed that he had been in possession of
illegal contraband and $4,700 in cash.52 After he was convicted of one count of
possessing cocaine with intent to distribute, the government sought forfeiture

42. See id. at 260, 262 (“[T]his Court has never considered an application of the Excessive Fines
Clause . . . .”).
43. Id. at 268 (emphasis added).
44. Id. at 264.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 266.
47. Id. at 266–67.
48. An Act Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject and Setleing the Succession of the
Crowne, 1688, 1 W. & M., sess. 2, § 9 (Eng.), reprinted in VI THE STATUTES OF THE REALM 142,
143 (Dawsons of Pall Mall 1963) (1819) (emphasis added).
49. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 265.
50. Colgan, Reviving the Excessive Fines Clause, supra note 17, at 298 (explaining that the BrowningFerris Court “determined that the historical considerations mandated a narrow definition of ‘fines’ that
limited the term to ‘payment to a sovereign as a punishment for some offense’”) (quoting BrowningFerris, 492 U.S. at 265).
51. 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
52. Id. at 605.
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of his home and business.53 Austin challenged the in rem (against the property)
action on the ground that it violated the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth
Amendment.54 Over the government’s objection that the Eighth Amendment
did not apply because the forfeiture sought was civil in nature, the Court ruled
that assets obtained through civil forfeiture fall under the ambit of the Excessive
Fines Clause.55 As the Austin Court explained, “the notion of punishment . . .
cuts across the division between the civil and the criminal law.”56
The Court further elaborated, stating that, “a civil sanction that cannot
fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained
as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment . . . .”57
This ruling did not alter the earlier established requirements that a “fine” be a
payment made to the government as a punitive measure. Rather, it provided
additional color on what types of payments would be considered punitive and
thus constitute a fine for purposes of the Excessive Fines Clause. Professor Beth
A. Colgan has summed up that doctrinal expansion as follows: “If the
government imposes the economic sanction upon a determination that the
person committed a prohibited activity, or links the economic sanction to other
recognized forms of punishment, the economic sanction constitutes a fine for
the purposes of the Excessive Fines Clause.”58
A good question to ask at this point is what makes a payment to the
government punitive as opposed to merely administrative or compensatory?
Take the following example: imagine that you are issued a $60 traffic ticket for
driving over the speed limit. The $60 payment to the government for breaking
the law is punitive and thus a fine. By contrast, paying $60 in damages to the
local U.S. post office for accidentally backing into a public mailbox is not a fine.
Otherwise said, a payment that is strictly remedial is not a fine.59 While the
Court has not yet addressed whether special assessment fees should be
considered “fines” under the Eighth Amendment, I argue in Part III that they
should.
B.

Bajakajian and the Meaning of Constitutionally “Excessive” Fines

Having established the meaning of “fines” within the context of the Eighth
Amendment in Browning-Ferris, United States v. Bajakajian60 provided an
53. Id. at 604. A forfeiture occurs when the government seizes property in the control of a
defendant. See Beth A. Colgan, Fines, Fees and Forfeitures, 18 CRIMINOLOGY, CRIM. JUST., L. & SOC’Y
22, 23 (2017).
54. Austin, 509 U.S. at 604.
55. Id. at 622.
56. Id. at 610 (quoting United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447–48 (1989)).
57. Id. (quoting Halper, 490 U.S. at 448).
58. Colgan, Challenging the Modern Debtors’ Prison, supra note 17, at 23–24.
59. See Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 265 (1989).
60. 524 U.S. 321 (1998).
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opportunity for the Court to explicate the meaning of “excessive.”61 Bajakajian
involved an interaction of federal statutes where the Court held that forcing a
traveler to forfeit $357,144 for failing to declare on his customs form that he
had carried more than $10,000 in cash out of the United States violated the
Excessive Fines Clause.62 Defendant Hosep Bajakajian and his wife had
attempted to board an international flight from Los Angeles when customs
inspectors found $357,144 in their checked luggage.63 Bajakajian was required
by federal law to report that he was transporting more than $10,000 out of the
country.64 He did not do so and pleaded guilty to the crime of failing to report.65
Because forfeiture laws make “any property . . . involved in such offense”
subject to forfeiture, the government sought forfeiture of $357,144.66
The district court instead ordered a $15,000 forfeiture, recognizing that
requiring Bajakajian to surrender all the money would be “extraordinarily
harsh” and “grossly disproportionate to the offense in question” and thus violate
the Excessive Fines Clause.67 The government appealed the $15,000 forfeiture
order68 and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.69 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari.70 Although the Court’s Excessive Fines Clause jurisprudence had, to
that point, only examined the meaning of “fines” within the Clause,71 the Court
had “little trouble concluding that the forfeiture of currency” was “punishment”
and thus a fine within the scope of the Eighth Amendment.72 Of particular
importance to the Court’s conclusion was its observation that the forfeiture
order in Bajakajian was imposed at the “culmination of a criminal proceeding
and require[d] conviction of an underlying felony.”73
Turning to whether the fine imposed was constitutionally excessive, the
Court did not rely on the historical definition of “excessive” for an interpretive
roadmap74 because “[t]he text and history of the Excessive Fines Clause . . .
61. See id. at 334–37.
62. Id. at 324–25, 334.
63. Id. at 324–25.
64. Id. at 325.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 326.
68. Id.
69. See United States v. Bajakajian, 84 F.3d 334, 335 (9th Cir. 1996).
70. The Court had not yet had the occasion to address the question of what constitutes an
“excessive” fine under the Eighth Amendment.
71. See Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 334.
72. See id. at 328.
73. Id.
74. After completing a historical analysis of the Eighth Amendment, the Bajakajian Court
“[r]ecogniz[ed] that none of the historical sources examined ‘suggests how disproportional to the
gravity of an offense a fine must be in order to be deemed constitutionally excessive[.]’ [T]he Court
then turned to its prior ‘gross disproportionality’ case law, developed in the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause context.” McLean, supra note 17, at 842; see also Austin v. United States, 509 U.S.
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provide[d] little guidance as to how disproportional a punitive forfeiture must
be to the gravity of an offense in order to be ‘excessive.’”75 Since there was no
textual guidance from which to draw, the Court instead leaned “on other
considerations in deriving a constitutional excessiveness standard.”76 The
proportionality test from its Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause precedents
served as an entry point to the excessiveness inquiry.77
The “touchstone” of the inquiry, the Court noted, “is the principle of
proportionality: The amount of the forfeiture must bear some relationship to
the gravity of the offense that it is designed to punish.”78 Applying this
standard, two factors were dispositive to the Court’s holding that the forfeiture
order of $357,144 was constitutionally excessive. First, the “reporting offense”79
was a crime that had “a minimal level of culpability”80 and carried only a
maximum fine of $5,000.81 The seriousness of the offense was mitigated by the
defendant’s conduct, which “was unrelated to any other illegal activities” in that
“[t]he money was the proceeds of legal activity and was to be used to repay a
lawful debt.”82 That added fact made it clear to the Court that Bajakajian did
“not fit into the class of persons for whom the statute was principally designed:
He [was] not a money launderer, a drug trafficker, or a tax evader.”83 In other
words, had he been a money launderer or engaged in any unlawful activity that
evinces a greater degree of seriousness than failing to report money on his
customs form, a $357,144 fine might have been more proportional to the
offense.
The second factor compelling the Court’s decision was that the harm to
the government was “relatively minor.”84 “Had his crime gone undetected, the
Government would have been deprived only of the information that $357,144
had left the country.”85 Because of the comparatively exiguous nature of the
offense and the magnitude of the fine, the Court concluded that the forfeiture

602, 611 (1993); McLean, supra note 17, at 838 n.14 (“In Bajakajian, the Supreme Court simply stated
that Webster’s 1828 dictionary defines ‘excessive’ as ‘beyond the common measure or proportion.’ The
Court’s decision to ignore the second definition provided, and instead to quote only half of the first
definition, is a somewhat surprising one—particularly because the example Webster provides in
support of the second (much broader) definition of ‘excessive’ is the following: ‘Excessive bail shall not
be required.’”) (citations omitted).
75. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 335.
76. Id. at 336.
77. See id. at 334.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 337.
80. Id. at 339.
81. Id. at 338.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 339.
85. Id.
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sought by the government “would be grossly disproportional to the gravity of
his offense” and thus violate the Excessive Fines Clause.86
If there is any point of consensus about the grossly disproportionate
standard announced in Bajakajian, it is that the inquiry into the excessiveness
of a fine remains unclear. We now know that measuring excessiveness requires
considering the severity of a punishment against the seriousness of the conduct.87
But as Adam J. Kolber has argued persuasively, “[o]ffenders can be sentenced
to punishments that are identical in name but that differ substantially in their
severity”88 because of how they impact a particular defendant. This logical
reality suggests that an individualized look at the hardship a punishment would
inflict on that specific defendant is relevant to the proportionality analysis.
However, since the respondent in Bajakajian did not raise an argument to the
effect that the proportionality determination should consider the consequences
of the punishment on his specific livelihood, the Supreme Court declined to
consider the issue.89
C.

Timbs v. Indiana and Defendants’ Ability To Pay

Predictably, the resulting doctrinal gap in Bajakajian has frustrated lower
courts and generated inconsistency in the application of the Excessive Fines
Clause.90 Recently, the Court has acknowledged that a defendant’s ability to
pay a fine may be relevant to the assessment of punishment severity. Chief
Justice Roberts conveyed this understanding most recently at oral arguments in
the 2019 case Timbs v. Indiana.91
Defendant Tyson Timbs pleaded guilty to a drug violation and conspiracy
to commit theft after he was arrested for attempting to sell heroin to an
undercover officer.92 Because he drove a $42,000 Land Rover to the site of the
arranged transaction, the State of Indiana sought forfeiture of the vehicle on

86. Id. at 339–40.
87. Id. at 336.
88. Kolber, supra note 34, at 188.
89. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 340 n.15 (“Respondent does not argue that his wealth or income are
relevant to the proportionality determination or that full forfeiture would deprive him of his
livelihood . . . and the District Court made no factual findings in this respect.”).
90. See, e.g., State v. Goodenow, 282 P.3d 8, 17 (Or. Ct. App. 2012) (“Whether an otherwise
proportional fine is excessive can depend on, for example, the financial resources available to a
defendant, the other financial obligations of the defendant, and the effect of the fine on the defendant’s
ability to be self-sufficient.”) (citing Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 335–36). But see Duckworth v. United
States ex rel. Locke, 705 F. Supp. 2d 30, 48 (D.D.C. 2010) (concluding after analyzing Bajakajian that
“ability to pay is not a component of the Eighth Amendment proportionality analysis”), aff’d, 418 F.
App’x 2 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
91. Oral Argument at 24:06, Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019) (No. 17-1091),
https://www.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-1091 [https://perma.cc/YZE3-GVD4].
92. Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 686.
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the ground that it was “used to facilitate violation of a criminal statute.”93 Timbs
challenged the forfeiture as unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment’s
Excessive Fines Clause, arguing that it would be grossly disproportional to the
offense.94 The trial court agreed and Indiana’s appellate court affirmed the
decision.95 The Supreme Court of Indiana reversed, finding that the Excessive
Fines Clause was not incorporated against the states.96
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and, by a 9-0 vote, held that
the Excessive Fines Clause constrains the states under the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.97 At oral argument, Chief Justice John
Roberts raised a pointed question indicating that an individualized inquiry into
one’s financial status may bear on the analysis of punishment severity and thus
under Bajakajian would also bear on its constitutional “excessiveness.”98 He
queried whether a forty-two thousand dollars forfeiture that may not “seem
excessive” to a wealthy person would be excessive “if someone is
impoverished.”99 Even after this explicit acknowledgement of the potential
relevance of the ability to pay on measuring the excessiveness of fines, the Court
did not probe deeper into the issue to develop the analysis.100 The Court’s
refusal to clarify what role, if any, a defendant’s financial situation should factor
into the excessiveness inquiry is lamentable, particularly since fines are
increasingly used in the United States as an instrument of punishment.101
A breakthrough case decided after Timbs v. Indiana that took advantage of
the clear opening created by Justice Roberts’ above-referenced inquiry is
Colorado Department of Labor & Employment v. Dami Hospitality, LLC.102 The
Dami court found that a defendant’s inability to pay a fine as part of their
sentence can make the fine constitutionally excessive, “steer[ing] excessive fines
jurisprudence toward a faithful, historically rooted understanding of the
clause.”103 Dami, the owner-operator of a Denver motel with fewer than ten
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. State v. Timbs, 62 N.E.3d 472, 473 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).
96. State v. Timbs, 84 N.E.3d 1179, 1184 (Ind. 2017).
97. Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 689.
98. Oral Argument, supra note 91, at 24:18.
99. Id.
100. See id.
101. The rise in the use of fines as a form of punishment comes as the increasingly high cost of
financing the mass incarceration apparatus puts pressure on state budgets. See, e.g., Jessica M. Eaglin,
Improving Economic Sanctions in the States, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1837, 1845 (2015) (“Due to the pressures
on justice systems created by mass incarceration, some states are shifting toward fines-based
punishment as a viable alternative to incarceration for low-level offenses.”).
102. 442 P.3d 94 (Colo. 2019).
103. Recent Cases, Eighth Amendment — Excessive Fines Clause — Colorado Supreme Court Extends
Excessive Fines Clause Protections to Corporations and Requires Ability to Pay Be Considered. — Colorado
Department of Labor & Employment v. Dami Hospitality, LLC, 442 P.3d 94 (Colo. 2019), 133 HARV.
L. REV. 1492, 1492 (2020).
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workers, was statutorily required to maintain workers’ compensation insurance
for its employees.104 Having failed to comply with the statute by allowing its
insurance coverage to lapse on several occasions, Dami was issued per diem fines
totaling $841,200.105 The fines were assessed pursuant to a mandatory fee
schedule.106 Dami challenged the fines on several grounds, including that the
company’s annual payroll was less than $50,000 so payment could not be
made.107 To induce Dami to settle, the Division of Workers’ Compensation
offered to reduce the fee to $425,000, but the settlement was not
consummated.108
Dami sued, alleging in relevant part that the assessed per diem fines were
constitutionally excessive under the Eighth Amendment.109 Observing that the
Eighth Amendment also protects corporations from excessive fines, the
Colorado Supreme Court found “persuasive evidence that a fine that is more
than a person can pay may be ‘excessive’ within the meaning of the Eighth
Amendment.”110 It thus concluded that, “in considering the severity of the
penalty, the ability of the regulated individual or entity to pay is a relevant
consideration.”111 The case was remanded to the lower court to “permit the
development of an evidentiary record sufficient to allow the application of [the]
Excessive Fines Clause analysis.”112
Having said all this, Dami should be considered the exception, not the
norm. The trend in lower courts has been to read Bajakajian—the only Supreme
Court case to opine on the meaning of excessiveness—as foreclosing an inquiry
into the financial situation of a defendant as part of a proportionality analysis.113
104. Dami, 442 P.3d at 96.
105. Id. at 97.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 98.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 101. The court was mindful of historic evidence cited by the Supreme Court in cases
involving the Excessive Fines Clause. One example of such evidence is the Magna Carta’s requirement
that the size of fines not deprive individuals of their livelihoods. Another is Blackstone’s Commentaries
on the Laws of England, which states that “no man shall have a larger amercement imposed upon him,
than his circumstances or personal estate will bear.” Id. (citing Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v.
Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 271 (1989)); see also Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 688 (2019).
With these observations in mind, the court concluded that that the defendant’s ability to pay a fine is
a “relevant consideration” in determining the “severity of the penalty.” Id. at 103.
111. Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 103.
112. Id.
113. This assumption is based on existing evidence about how lower courts have attempted to
resolve the doctrinal gap in the Excessive Fines Clause. See, e.g., United States v. 817 N.E. 29th Drive,
175 F.3d 1304, 1311 (11th Cir. 1999) (“[E]xcessiveness is determined in relation to the characteristics
of the offense, not in relation to the characteristics of the offender.”) (emphasis added); United States v.
Dicker, 198 F.3d 1284, 1292 n.11 (11th Cir. 1999) (“[W]e do not take into account the personal impact
of a forfeiture on the specific defendant in determining whether the forfeiture violates the Eighth
Amendment.”); United States v. Dubose, 146 F.3d 1141, 1146 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[A]n Eighth
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Thus, it is likely that many courts will be inclined to omit a defendant’s financial
status in their evaluation of proportionality until an ability-to-pay test is
adopted, a situation that will continue to disadvantage the poorest defendants.
II. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
In order to determine whether the Excessive Fines Clause applies to
special assessments, we must first determine whether special assessment fees
constitute “fines.” In this determination, it is helpful to consider special
assessments in the context of other economic sanctions. This part provides a
brief overview of the different economic sanctions that can be imposed as part
of a criminal sentence: special assessments, fines, restitution, and forfeiture.
A.

Special Assessments

The special assessment scheme originated as a result of the interlocking
gears of advocacy in the 1960s and 1970s to provide reparations for crime
victims.114 During this time, policymakers were focused on making punishment
for criminal wrongdoers more punitive while also seeking to shore up
protections for crime victims.115 These two pursuits conveniently overlapped to
result in the adoption of a number of criminal mechanisms to reform the
criminal legal system, including the special assessment statute.116
As social unrest was sweeping through cities across the country in the late
1960s, reports that crime and violence were on the rise blanketed the nation’s
press.117 Observing that the uprisings followed the civil rights gains of that era,
the civil rights movement was blamed for the rise in crime (real or perceived).118
As a result, the idea that crime was primarily a result of individual choices—
and not social and economic dislocation, as had been put forth by civil rights

Amendment gross disproportionality analysis does not require an inquiry into the hardship the sanction
may work on the offender.”).
114. Much of the change in crime control policy—hardening criminal laws and shoring up
protections for victims—was driven by the “law and order” rhetoric that followed the civil rights gains
of the same era. To be sure, while crime rates had increased at that time, the accounts of turmoil were
sensationalized to justify increasing incarceration of offenders and the use of economic sanctions. See
generally PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME, VICTIMS OF CRIME IN AMERICA
(1982), https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/ovc/87299.pdf [https://perma.cc/RWR9-Y5M4] (making
recommendations for action by governmental agencies).
115. Id.
116. See Lynne N. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim’s Rights, 37 STAN. L. REV. 937, 949–50 (1985).
117. ARI BERMAN, GIVE US THE BALLOT: THE MODERN STRUGGLE FOR VOTING RIGHTS IN
AMERICA 65 (2015) (“The riots were front-page news across the country, covered in the most
sensationalized tones. The cover of Life showed a black youth carrying a table and chair out of a burning
home. The magazine sent nine correspondents to cover the story and ran eleven pages of color photos
in its August 27, 1965, edition, with captions like ‘“Get Whitey!” The War Cry That Terrorized Los
Angeles,’ and ‘In a Roaring Inferno “Burn Baby Burn.”’”).
118. Id. at 67.
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advocates—began to gain traction in public discourse.119 This development
intensified the public’s desire to punish criminal wrongdoers.120
Around the same time, the view that the interests of victims were not
being adequately addressed by the states was frequently expressed.121 It is no
accident that the rumblings about victims’ interests started around the same
time Miranda v. Arizona122 was decided. The Warren Court’s rights-protective
orientation toward criminal defendants in cases like Miranda was an important
signpost for the victims’ rights movement. While the Court was carving out
protections for criminal defendants, commentators were ringing the alarm bell
that the Court was not doing enough to protect crime victims.123 The increasing
centrality of these two complementary issues gave legislatures a freer hand to
pass “tough” sentencing laws and address both issues at once. Lawmakers
responded by adopting criminal laws and penalties that hardened punishment
for wrongdoers while simultaneously accounting for the allegedly historically
neglected rights of victims.124
In 1984, after “a decade long bipartisan effort of the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary,”125 special assessments were created as Title II, Chapter XIV of
the Victims of Crime Act of 1984 (“VOCA”).126 VOCA was designed to
“provide limited Federal funding to the States, with minimal bureaucratic
‘strings attached,’ for direct compensation and service programs to assist victims
of crime . . . .”127 Codified in § 3013 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code, special
assessments are nominal fees assessed upon defendants convicted of a
misdemeanor or felony against the United States.128 A special assessment fee is
imposed for each count of conviction.129 This means that a “defendant convicted
of multiple felonies [or misdemeanors] is subject to multiple assessments.”130
119. Henderson, supra note 116, at 943–45
120. Id. at 945.
121. Id. at 947–48.
122. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
123. Henderson, supra note 116, at 948.
124. See Caitlyn Curley, Tough on Crime: How the United States Packed Its Own Prisons, GENBIZ
(Dec. 3, 2015), http://www.genfkd.org/tough-on-crime-united-states-packed-prisons [https://perma.cc
/7QCS-ZZJM].
125. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 1 (1983), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3184.
126. Victims of Crime Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, Title II, ch. XIV, 98 Stat. 2171 (codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3013).
127. S. REP. NO. 98-497, at 1 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3607, 3607 [hereinafter
1984 Senate Report].
128. 18 U.S.C. § 3013. I have deliberately only mentioned felonies (and not misdemeanors) thus
far because the subject of this Article is the imposition of special assessment fees on indigent felony
defendants.
129. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5E1.3 cmt. n.3 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2021); Marie
T. Farrelly, Special Assessments and the Origination Clause: A Tax on Crooks?, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 447,
447 (1989).
130. 9A FED. PROC., L. ED. § 22:1753 (2021).
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The amount imposed is fixed by statute131 and is to be collected “in the manner
that fines are collected in criminal cases.”132 The provision of VOCA mandating
special assessments for felony offenses provides that:
(a) The court shall assess on any person convicted of an offense against
the United States . . .
(2) in the case of a felony—
(A) the amount of $100 if the defendant is an
individual; and
(B) the amount of $400 if the defendant is a
person other than an individual
(b) Such amount so assessed shall be collected in the manner that fines
are collected in criminal cases.
(c) The obligation to pay an assessment ceases five years after the date
of the judgment. This subsection shall apply to all assessments
irrespective of the date of imposition.
(d) For the purposes of this section, an offense under section 13 of this
title is an offense against the United States.133
The proceeds are collected by the government and deposited into the Crime
Victims Fund to finance victims’ aid programs at the state level.134 The Office
for Victims of Crime administers the Crime Victims Fund,135 which primarily
benefits the most vulnerable in our society.136
131. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5E1.3 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2021).
132. 18 U.S.C. § 3013(b).
133. Id. § 3013(a)(2), (b)–(d) (emphasis added). Special assessments are also imposed for
misdemeanor convictions. The relevant provision is as follows:
(1) in the case of an infraction or a misdemeanor—
(A) if the defendant is an individual—
(i) the amount of $5 in the case of an infraction or a class C misdemeanor;
(ii) the amount of $10 in the case of a class B misdemeanor; and
(iii) the amount of $25 in the case of a class A misdemeanor; and
(B) if the defendant is a person other than an individual—
(i) the amount of $25 in the case of an infraction or a class C misdemeanor;
(ii) the amount of $50 in the case of a class B misdemeanor; and
(iii) the amount of $125 in the case of a class A misdemeanor.
Id. § 3013(a)(1).
134. 34 U.S.C. § 20101.
135. Victims of Crime Act Victim Assistance Program, 81 Fed. Reg. 44515, 44515 (July 8, 2016).
136. The administration of the funds from the Crime Victims Fund is set out by statute. The
process is described in the Federal Register, which is worth quoting at length:
The VOCA formula specifies that (in most years) the first $20M available in the Fund for
that year will go toward child abuse prevention and treatment programs, with a certain amount
to be set-aside for programs to address child abuse in Indian Country. After that, such sums
as may be necessary are available to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the U.S.
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Criminal Fines

Fines are economic sanctions used to punish defendants and deter
wrongdoing.137 Some jurisdictions utilize fines as prosecution diversion devices,
whereby charges against a defendant are dismissed when the court-ordered fines
are paid in full.138 The fines are typically imposed in combination with another
penalty rather than as the sole sanction.139 The majority of fines imposed by
district court judges are deposited in the Crime Victims Fund—the same fund
in which special assessment fees are deposited.140 Despite its illegality under
Bearden v. Georgia,141 which held that imprisoning someone simply for being too
poor to pay a fine violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment,142 there can be no doubt that the practice has not been
eradicated.143 The reason is because although Bearden made clear that people
cannot be imprisoned simply for being poor, it conditioned the prohibition on
whether the failure to pay was “willful[].”144 But since the Court did not define
the meaning of “willful[],” ad hoc judicial interpretation of the term has resulted
in some judges incarcerating people for exactly what Bearden had proscribed—
simply being poor.145 The close connection to other recognized forms of
punishment and the clear punitive intent in the scheme means that criminal
fines are unquestionably covered under the Excessive Fines Clause.

Attorneys Offices to improve services to victims of Federal crime, and to operate a victim
notification system. The remaining balance is allocated as follows: 47.5% for OVC’s Victim
Compensation Program, 47.5% for OVC’s Victim Assistance Program, and 5% for the OVC
Director to distribute in discretionary awards in certain statutorily defined categories.
Generally, under the distribution rules for the Victim Compensation Program, if a portion of
the 47.5% available for Compensation is not needed for that purpose, it is (per the statutory
formula) made available to augment the Victim Assistance Program. The Victim Assistance
Program distributes funds to States as mandated by VOCA, at 42 U.S.C. 10603. The VOCA
statutory distribution formula provides each State with a base amount (presently $500,000 for
each State and the District of Columbia; $200,000 for each eligible territory), and distributes
the remainder proportionately, based on population.
Id. at 44516.
137. See Sobol, supra note 26, at 499.
138. See Michael Tonry & Mary Lynch, Intermediate Sanctions, 20 CRIME & JUST: A REV. OF
RSCH. 99, 128 (1996).
139. See Sally T. Hillsman, Fines and Day Fines, 12 CRIME & JUST.: A REV. OF RSCH. 49, 49
140. U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., FEDERAL COURTS: DIFFERENCES EXIST IN ORDERING
FINES AND RESTITUTION 1 (1999), https://www.gao.gov/assets/ggd-99-70.pdf [https://perma.cc/
5D2P-CQFL].
141. 461 U.S. 660 (1983).
142. Id. at 672–73.
143. See Sobol, supra note 26, at 499–500.
144. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 672.
145. Joseph Shapiro, Supreme Court Ruling Not Enough To Prevent Debtors Prisons,
NPR (May 21, 2014), https://www.npr.org/2014/05/21/313118629/supreme-court-ruling-not-enoughto-prevent-debtors-prisons [https://perma.cc/D22X-VXA9].
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Restitution

Another type of economic sanction that can be imposed as a consequence
of a criminal conviction is restitution. Restitution refers to a court-ordered
payment by the convicted defendant to compensate the victim of a crime for
tangible financial losses suffered as a result of the crime.146 Although it is now a
victim-oriented device, restitution was historically used to rehabilitate the
wrongdoer.147 Today, a court may order restitution against a convicted
defendant in any federal criminal case.148 Unlike special assessments and fines,
restitution is paid to a specific victim of a particular crime and is intended to
make the victim whole to the extent possible.149 Restitution is “[u]sually defined
in terms of actual damages and restoration of property, [and] . . . does not
encompass . . . concepts such as damages for pain and suffering.”150 Recognized
by statute in all fifty states,151 the right to restitution is codified in § 3663 of
Title 18 of the U.S. Code; it reads in relevant part:
The court, when sentencing a defendant convicted of an offense under
this title, section 401, 408(a), 409, 416, 420, or 422(a) of the Controlled
Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 841, 848(a), 849, 856, 861, 863) (but in no
case shall a participant in an offense under such sections be considered a
victim of such offense under this section), or section 5124, 46312, 46502,
or 46504 of title 49, other than an offense described in section 3663A(c),
may order, in addition to or, in the case of a misdemeanor, in lieu of any
other penalty authorized by law, that the defendant make restitution to
any victim of such offense . . . .152
Whether restitution constitutes a fine for purposes of the Clause is a
question that the Supreme Court has not yet answered. Lower courts are
divided on the issue. Some courts have concluded that restitution constitutes a
fine since it advances the “deterrent, rehabilitative, and retributive purposes”153
of punishment and “is not separate from the offender’s punishment but is an
aspect of it.”154 Other courts, however, have applied more stringent definitions
of “punitiveness” that were explicitly rejected by the Supreme Court in Austin
146. R. Barry Ruback & Mark H. Bergstrom, Economic Sanctions in Criminal Justice: Purposes,
Effects, and Implications, 33 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 242, 249 (2006).
147. Matthew Dickman, Should Crime Pay?: A Critical Assessment of the Mandatory Victims
Restitutions Act of 1996, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1687, 1702–03 (2009).
148. 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1)(A) (providing that restitution can be imposed for all offenses under
Title 18).
149. United States v. Simmonds, 235 F.3d 826, 830–31 (3d Cir. 2000).
150. Henderson, supra note 116, at 1007 (citing Alan T. Harland, Monetary Remedies for the Victims
of Crime: Assessing the Role of the Criminal Courts, 30 UCLA L. REV. 52, 60–64 (1982)).
151. See, e.g., PEGGY M. TOBOLOWSKY, DOUGLAS E. BELOOF, MARIO T. GABOURY, ARRICK
L. JACKSON & ASHLEY G. BLACKBURN, CRIME VICTIM RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 171 (3d ed. 2016).
152. 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1)(A).
153. United States v. Dubose, 146 F.3d 1141, 1144 (9th Cir. 1998).
154. State v. Good, 100 P.3d 644, 649 (Mont. 2004).
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in its determination that restitution does not constitute a fine based on these
definitions.155
D.

Forfeitures

Unlike restitution, little controversy exists about whether forfeitures are
punitive, a question the Supreme Court recently answered in the affirmative in
Timbs.156 Forfeiture refers to the government’s seizure of property in the control
of a defendant.157 In response to the rise of organized crime158 and the
“epidemic” drug problem in the 1970s,159 Congress passed two significant pieces
of legislation in 1970 that altered the landscape of federal criminal law and made
criminal forfeiture a fixture in sentencing proceedings. The first statute is the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”),160 adopted as
Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act.161 A violation of RICO triggers
a forfeiture penalty of “any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds
which the person obtained, directly or indirectly, from racketeering
activity . . . .”162
The second statute Congress enacted in 1970, as organized crime and
illegal drug trafficking raged on,163 is the Continuing Criminal Enterprise
(“CCE”)164 Statute. This statute was part of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse

155. Colgan, Challenging the Modern Debtors’ Prison, supra note 17, at 43–44 (“[L]ower courts have
determined that restitution does not constitute a fine based on an improper substitution of more
restrictive tests for punitiveness used to determine the applicability of the Double Jeopardy and Ex
Post Facto Clauses. Unlike the excessive fines test, in the double jeopardy and ex post facto contexts,
the Supreme Court has held that the relevant inquiry is whether a penalty is so punitive that it
overwhelms any remedial goal so as to exhibit a legislative intent that the penalty be criminal in nature
despite the fact that the penalty is nominally civil. The Austin Court explicitly rejected the application
of this stricter standard in favor of the partially punitive test.”).
156. Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 690 (2019). In previous cases, the Court held that forfeitures
are fines for purposes of the Excessive Fines Clause. See, e.g., Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S.
544, 558–59 (1993) (regarding criminal forfeitures); Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 604 (1993)
(regarding civil forfeitures).
157. Alice W. Dery, Overview of Asset Forfeiture, A.B.A. (June 30, 2012), https://www.americanbar.
org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2012/06/02_dery/ [https://permacc/5P3D-FMK8].
158. See, e.g., DONALD R. CRESSY, THEFT OF THE NATION: THE STRUCTURES AND
OPERATIONS OF ORGANIZED CRIME IN AMERICA 1–3 (1969); Craig M. Bradley, Racketeers, Congress
and the Courts: An Analysis of RICO, 65 IOWA L. REV. 837, 837–38 (1980).
159. H.R. REP. NO. 91-1444, pt. 1, at 6 (1970), as reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4566, 4572.
According to the drafters of the Act, illegal drug abuse and trafficking at the time had reached
“epidemic proportions.” Id.
160. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–68.
161. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 901(a), 84 Stat. 922, 941
(codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–68).
162. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(3).
163. See S. REP. NO. 91-617, at 1 (1969).
164. 21 U.S.C. § 848.
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Prevention and Control Act of 1970.165 The penalty for violating the CCE
Statute includes forfeiture of property obtained from the crime.166 The use of
forfeiture has expanded considerably since the federal forfeiture statutes were
enacted.167 More than 200 federal offenses are now punishable by forfeiture,168
including mail fraud, federal program fraud, and wire fraud.169
III. A NEW APPROACH TO IMPOSING SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS
Given the breadth of economic sanctions that can be imposed on indigent
defendants, the Court’s failure to adopt an ability-to-pay test in determining
the constitutionality of imposing such sanctions demonstrates a lack of
commitment to protect poor people against unmanageable fines. Indeed,
“failure to adjust economic sanctions according to financial capacity results in a
flattening of punishment, which undermines the Court’s interest in promoting
comparative proportionality between offenses of different seriousness.”170 With
that in mind, this part suggests one workable but underappreciated way
policymakers can afford protections to the most financially vulnerable in our
criminal legal system.
The starting point is Section III.A, which makes the case that special
assessment fees are punitive and are thus fines within the meaning of the
Excessive Fines Clause. Section III.B then argues that the special assessment
scheme is in tension with current sentencing practices. Sentencing is a holistic
undertaking whereby judges exercise discretion to make sound decisions based
on information including a defendant’s background.171 Mandating the
165. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat.
1236, 1265–66 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–904, 951–71).
166. 21 U.S.C. § 848(a) (“Any person who engages in a continuing criminal enterprise shall be
sentenced . . . to the forfeiture prescribed in section 853 of this title.”); 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)–(b)
(defining property that is subject to criminal forfeiture).
167. See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS ISSUE BRIEF, FINES, FEES, AND BAIL: PAYMENTS IN
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM THAT DISPROPORTIONALLY IMPACT THE POOR 3 (2015),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/1215_cea_fine_fee_bail_issue_brie
f.pdf [https://perma.cc/VG7U-B8EL]; KARIN D. MARTIN, SANDRA SUSAN SMITH & WENDY STILL,
HARVARD KENNEDY SCH.: PROGRAM IN CRIM. JUST. POL’Y & MGMT., SHACKLED TO DEBT:
CRIMINAL JUSTICE FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS AND THE BARRIERS TO RE-ENTRY THEY
CREATE 4–5 (2017), https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/centers/wiener/programs/pcj/
files/shackled_to_debt.pdf [https://perma.cc/5QHS-PLND].
168. Dery, supra note 157.
169. 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(3).
170. Colgan, Challenging the Modern Debtors’ Prison, supra note 17, at 16.
171. See United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 151 (1997) (noting “the longstanding principle that
sentencing courts have broad discretion to consider various kinds of information”); Payne v. Tennessee,
501 U.S. 808, 820–21 (1991) (“[T]he sentencing authority has always been free to consider a wide range
of relevant material.”); United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972) (“[B]efore [determining
what sentence to impose], a judge may appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely
unlimited either as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source from which it may
come.”).
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imposition of special assessment fees when the judge has already determined
that a defendant is too poor to pay any amount of money erodes the value of
that discretion. Section III.B concludes by advocating for a new approach that
allows for judicial leeway in the imposition of special assessment fees. Section
III.C addresses some implementation and cost concerns with the approach
advocated, including that waiving the imposition of special assessment fees on
indigent defendants may under-deter the poor.
A.

Why Special Assessment Fees Are Punitive

One of the threshold claims of this Article is that special assessment fees
qualify as fines within the scope of the Excessive Fines Clause. Monetary
penalties need not be completely punitive to qualify as a fine under the
Excessive Fines Clause.172 The test for determining whether an economic
sanction is partially punitive is broad.173 An economic sanction is punitive when:
(1) it is imposed as a consequence of engaging in prohibited conduct and the
money is owed to the government rather than a private party,174 or (2) the
economic sanction is “link[ed] . . . to other recognized forms of punishment.”175
Special assessment fees satisfy the first definition of the test, as they are
economic sanctions paid to the government for engaging in prohibited
conduct.176 We can hence end the analysis there since an economic sanction need
only satisfy one of the definitions of the partially punitive test. But we need not
rely on this point alone because there is a nonfrivolous argument to be made
that the fees are also punitive under the second means of satisfying the test.
The evidentiary basis for this conclusion comes from applying the statute.
Like other forms of punishment, special assessment fees are imposed only after
a defendant is convicted of an offense against the United States.177 The Supreme
Court observed in Austin v. United States that punitive intent can be discerned
when an economic sanction is treated like other kinds of punishment.178 In
Austin, the Court reasoned that merely listing forfeitures “alongside the other
provisions for punishment” in a statute substantiated the claim that forfeitures
are punitive.179 Here, special assessments are economic sanctions “link[ed] . . .
to other recognized forms of punishment,”180 i.e., forfeitures, because they are

172. Colgan, Challenging the Modern Debtors’ Prison, supra note 17, at 18.
173. Id. at 23 (“[I]n announcing the partially punitive test, the Court provided . . . a broadly
protective understanding of the Clause.”).
174. See id. at 21–23.
175. Id. at 24.
176. See supra Section II.A.
177. See supra Section II.A.
178. See 509 U.S. 602, 613–14 (1993).
179. Id. at 614.
180. Colgan, Challenging the Modern Debtors’ Prison, supra note 17, at 24.
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imposed as a direct result of a defendant’s conviction.181 The Bajakajian Court
said much the same thing about the meaning of punitiveness when it concluded
that the forfeiture order at issue in that case was punitive because it was imposed
at the “culmination of a criminal proceeding and require[d] conviction of an
underlying felony.”182 Additionally, special assessment fees are associated with
other recognized forms of punishment because they are statutorily mandated to
be collected in the same manner as criminal fines,183 which are undisputedly
punitive.
These obvious parallels to punitive sanctions lead to the conclusion that
special assessments are punitive under the second branch of the test. But taking
the argument yet further, legislative history suggests that special assessment
fees were always intended to be punitive. The Senate Report on the statute
lends additional support to this conclusion. Not only did the Senate refer to
special assessments as “penalty assessment fines,” “penalty assessment[s],”
“penalties,” and “penalty fee[s]” throughout the Report,184 but it also noted that
the Victims of Crime Act, which established the special assessments statute,185
was intended to “provide limited Federal funding to the States . . . to assist
victims of crime.”186 This point requires further explanation. While the
reference to “limited” funding alone is not significant, it is incongruous to
everything else we know about the development of the special assessment
statute, suggesting that funding for crime victims was not the only motivation
for its adoption.
The Act was adopted in the mid-1980s, a period when violent crime was
in the ascendancy, as was the number of victims.187 If the Senate’s objective in
adopting the statute was solely to finance crime victims’ programs, it follows that
the resulting fee structure would have done more to ensure there would be
enough funding to support all crime victims—an unknowable but expectedly
high number at the time. For example, perhaps the fee structure would have
looked more restitutionary in nature, with ties to specific victim needs. Instead,
the structure is more akin to a standardized fee that—like criminal fines—

181. United States v. Mayberry, 774 F.2d 1018, 1021 (10th Cir. 1985).
182. United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 328 (1998).
183. 18 U.S.C. § 3013(b) (“Such amount so assessed shall be collected in the manner that fines are
collected in criminal cases.”).
184. 1984 Senate Report, supra note 127, at 13.
185. Victims of Crime Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, Title II, ch. XIV, 98 Stat. 2171 (codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3013).
186. 1984 Senate Report, supra note 127, at 1.
187. Scott Boggess & John Bound, Did Criminal Activity Increase During the 1980s? Comparisons
Across Data Sources, 78 SOC. SCI. Q. 725, 725 (1997) (“When the focus is on serious violent crime, all
indicators show a rise in the mid-1980s. The timing and nature of the rise in criminal activity seem to
implicate crack cocaine.”).
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merely happens to be placed into a fund for unspecified victim needs.188
Alternatively, if the goal of the statute was solely to raise revenue, perhaps the
fee simply would have been set at a higher amount, in light of the unknowable
but expectedly high number of crime victims. But the current fee structure
evidences other intentions.
The foregoing analysis may invite the objection that the Senate viewed
special assessments as a revenue-raising tool but simply did not think the
revenue generated would be significant. Rather, the objection might proceed,
the Senate thought that special assessments would be imposed on defendants
infrequently. This interpretation strains credulity when viewed in the context
of the environment in which special assessment fees became part of the criminal
legal system. First, from the very beginning, the imposition of special
assessments could only be waived upon motion of the prosecutor present at
sentencing.189 As I have already noted, prosecutors rarely move for the court to
remit special assessments today.190 It is thus unlikely that in the heyday of the
“tough on crime” period of the criminal legal system when the mass
incarceration apparatus was expanding dramatically, prosecutors were more
likely to request that judges waive the imposition of the special assessment on
indigent defendants than they are now. Since special assessments come close to
being de facto mandatory191 and the scheme was adopted when defendants were
funneled through the criminal legal system at then-unprecedented levels, the
better view appears to be that the Senate knew, or should have known, that
special assessment fees would be imposed routinely.
A cynic might also contend that the Senate understood special assessment
fees would be frequently imposed, but nevertheless thought that the scheme
188. Jeffery A. Parness, Laura Lee & Edmund Laube, Monetary Recoveries for State Crime Victims,
58 CLEV. STATE L. REV. 819, 849–50 (2010) (“The federal Crime Victims Fund assists states in
funding their crime victim recovery schemes. Unlike state funds that provide monies directly to crime
victims, the federal fund simply awards grants to states. Since 2002, the Crime Victims Fund makes
annual grants constituting about sixty percent of the monies available to state funds. To receive grants,
state funds must qualify. Eligible funds must be operated by the state, offer compensatory awards to
victims, and promote victim cooperation with law enforcement. Grant recipients must also certify that
the state will not cut funds already available, that the fund does not discriminate between citizens and
non-citizens or between victims of state offenses and federal offenses, that the fund will not deny
claimants based on their family or residential relationship with the alleged offender . . . .”).
189. See infra Appendix. The criminal title of the U.S. Department of Justice manual states that,
“where there is no likelihood that the [special] assessment will be paid, the Assistant United States
Attorney who is present at sentencing should move for remission of the special assessments pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. § 3573 at the time of sentencing. The absence of assets can be evidenced by the need for
court appointed counsel or based on information from the border patrol in the case of an undocumented
alien.” U.S. Dep’t of Just., Just. Manual § 9-143.520 (2020).
190. See infra Appendix.
191. The only “carve out” to the mandatory imposition of special assessment fees is when a
prosecutor motions for the judge to remit the fee. Since prosecutors rarely move for such action, it is
appropriate to refer to the fees as de facto mandatory. See infra Appendix.
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would bring in limited revenue. That argument proceeds on the assumption
that the Senate anticipated courts would have difficulties collecting the fees. It
is true that like other LFOs imposed on poor defendants, special assessments
are difficult to collect.192 But there is no evidence to support the argument that
difficulties in collecting the fees factored into the decision to adopt the special
assessment scheme. Even today, lawmakers generally do not weigh the
likelihood that individuals will be able to satisfy LFOs before deciding whether
the LFOs should be imposed in the first instance.193 Thus, the Senate’s
reference to “limited” funding for victims should suggest skepticism about
whether the scheme was adopted solely as a revenue-raising device. But even if
the Senate so intended, present reality shows that special assessment fees are
functionally punitive.
Despite the arguments in favor of characterizing special assessments as
punitive, it would be error to dismiss outright the argument that special
assessments are not punitive and thus do not qualify as fines under the
Excessive Fines Clause. It can be argued that special assessments are not
punitive because the amount assessed under § 3013 does not distinguish
between offenders of different blameworthiness.194 We cannot summarily
preclude this inference because a penal precept is that courts invoking criminal
fines have some general commitment to scaling the size of the penalty to the
seriousness of the offense.195 Indeed, this is precisely the relationship that the
Indiana appellate court described in Timbs.196
By contrast, so the argument goes, special assessments deviate from this
practice and should not be treated as fines because the required payment is the
same regardless of the seriousness of the offense. The problem with this
argument is that special assessments do calibrate the seriousness of the offense
into the size of the penalty imposed. For example, the statute imposes a higher

192. See, e.g., Colgan, Graduating Economic Sanctions, supra note 17, at 70 (“[C]ourt dockets are often
clogged by hearings where courts require people with outstanding debt to appear periodically, as well
as hearings triggered when debtors fall behind on payments.”).
193. See, e.g., ALICIA BANNON, MITALI NAGRECHA & REBEKAH DILLER, BRENNAN
CTR. FOR JUST., CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT: A BARRIER TO REENTRY 11 (2010), https://www.
brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/Report_Criminal-Justice-Debt-%20A-BarrierReentry.pdf [https://perma.cc/37HE-WMT8].
194. See Farrelly, supra note 129, at 466 (“[A special assessment] differs from a fine because it does
not vary in amount according to the specific nature of the offense committed.”).
195. Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[A] standard
principle of [punishment] theory is that ‘the punishment should fit the crime’ in the sense of being
proportional to the wrongfulness of the defendant’s action . . . .”).
196. See State v. Timbs, 62 N.E.3d 472, 476 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (“To determine whether a fine
or forfeiture is ‘excessive,’ for purposes of the Excessive Fines Clause, we consider whether the amount
of the forfeiture bears ‘some relationship to the gravity of the offense that it is designed to punish.’”)
(quoting $100 & A Black Cadillac v. State, 822 N.E.2d 1001, 1011 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)), vacated, 84
N.E.3d 1179 (Ind. 2016), vacated, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019).
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fee for felony convictions than for misdemeanors.197 Assessing higher penalties
for a more serious class of offenses suggests that Congress embraced an aspect
of proportionality in adopting the statute.
Some commentators, primarily retributivists, might be dissatisfied with
this account. They might contend that even though the special assessment fee
is higher for felony convictions than for misdemeanors, it does not distinguish
between offenders of different blameworthiness in any meaningful way unless
the imposition of the fee is proportioned to the specific crime within the classes
of offenses.198 To appreciate this point, compare the crime of felony forgery
involving a $100 check with a multimillion dollar Ponzi scheme. The
retributivist might say that even though the Ponzi scheme is objectively the
more serious crime, an individual felony defendant in each case would be
required to pay the same $100 special assessment fee for each count of
conviction. And so the lack of gradation within the felony class of offenses
suggests we should view with serious skepticism the idea that special assessment
fees comport with the penal precepts that punishment should be scaled to the
seriousness of the crime.
This argument paints with too small a brush. A more sophisticated version
of the argument recognizes that prosecutors are likely to charge felony
defendants accused of more serious offenses with more counts.199 The practical
effect of this prosecutorial discretion is that the above-referenced forgery
defendant is as a general matter more likely to face fewer counts than the Ponzi
scheme. Because a $100 special assessment is mandatory for each count of
conviction, the odds are that the forgery defendant would be required to pay
less than the Ponzi scheme defendant if convicted, evidencing an aspect of
proportionality within the class of felony offenses. This means that in the final
analysis, even if the special assessment scheme is not punitive on its face, it is
punitive as applied. Thus, the conclusion that special assessments constitute
fines for purposes of the Excessive Fines Clause retains its validity.
197. 18 U.S.C. § 3013(a).
198. See Elizabeth Bennett, Neuroscience and Criminal Law: Have We Been Getting It Wrong for
Centuries and Where Do We Go from Here?, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 437, 439 (2016) (“The retributivist
theory of punishment is proportional punishment, or ‘just deserts.’”).
199. See Andrew Manuel Crespo, The Hidden Law of Plea Bargaining, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1303,
1316 (2018) (explaining that prosecutors exercise discretion to “pile” charges by considering factors
such as the potential incarceratory term a defendant faces—a proxy for the seriousness of the offense);
see also James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1525 (1981)
(“Decisions whether and what to charge, and whether and on what terms to bargain, have been left in
prosecutors’ hands with very few limitations.”). See generally Jeffrey M. Chemerinsky, Counting Offenses,
58 DUKE L.J. 709, 710 (2009) (“As Chief Justice Warren acknowledged in a case addressing how to
divide drug charges, ‘[t]he problem of multiple punishment is a vexing and recurring one.’ . . . The law
is unclear in this area, forcing prosecutors to determine on a case-by-case basis whether to charge a
series of unlawful actions as a single, continuing course of conduct or as multiple separate offenses.”
(alteration in original)).
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Recalibrating the Scheme for Imposing Special Assessments

Having demonstrated why special assessments should be considered fines
within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment, the central claim of this Article
is that the special assessment scheme is in tension with current sentencing
practices that allow judges to exercise discretion to waive the imposition of fines
other than special assessment fees based on a defendant’s financial situation.
Accordingly, it advocates for a new approach permitting judges to unilaterally
waive the imposition of special assessments on indigent defendants. To be sure,
the number of stops between the status quo special assessment regime and a
discretionary scheme may be limitless.200 Where the line should be drawn is not
always clear. The argument in this Article is not meant to dictate the conclusion
that the status quo special assessment fee structure should be changed to a
purely discretionary one. Rather, it advocates for a special assessment system
that is tethered to the amount of other fines imposed, meaning that if a court
decides against imposing other fines because a defendant lacks the ability to
pay, no special assessment fee should be imposed.
1. Tethering the Imposition of Special Assessments to Other Fines
The U.S. Supreme Court has explained that “[s]entencing judges may, and
often do, consider the defendant’s ability to pay, but in such circumstances they
are guided by sound judicial discretion rather than by constitutional
mandate.”201 Turning to current sentencing practices, section 5E1.2 of the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”) provides that:
(a) The court shall impose a fine in all cases, except where the defendant
establishes that he is unable to pay and is not likely to become able to
pay any fine.
(b) The applicable fine guideline range is that specified in subsection (c)
below. If, however, the guideline for the offense in Chapter Two
provides a specific rule for imposing a fine, that rule takes precedence
over subsection (c) of this section.202
The minimum fine prescribed by the Guidelines is $200.203 The Guidelines
provide a list of factors that courts are required to consider when setting the
amount of the fine, including “any evidence presented as to the defendant’s
ability to pay the fine (including the ability to pay over a period of time) in
light of his earning capacity and financial resources; [and] the burden that the
200. See Kevin R. Reitz, The Enforceability of Sentencing Guidelines, 58 STAN. L. REV. 155, 157 (2005)
(“[T]here are an infinite number of stops between a purely advisory approach and a completely
mandatory framework.”).
201. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 22 (1973).
202. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5E1.2(a)–(b) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
203. Id. § 5E1.2(c)(3) (imposing a minimum fine of $200 for offenses level 3 and below).
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fine places on the defendant and his dependents relative to alternative
punishments.”204 Importantly,
[i]f the defendant establishes that (1) he is not able and, even with the
use of a reasonable installment schedule, is not likely to become able to pay
all or part of the fine required by the preceding provisions, or (2) imposition
of a fine would unduly burden the defendant’s dependents, the court may
impose a lesser fine or waive the fine.205
In many instances, a mandatory special assessment scheme runs headlong into
these clear guidelines.
This reality is reinforced by the following example. Suppose a defendant
is convicted on two counts of forgery, which carries a fine of $200. Because of
a drug addiction, the defendant was homeless and unemployed for five years
predating the commission of the crime, and has no financial assets. Based on
the defendant’s financial situation, the judge decides to waive the $200 fine.206
But the convictions on the two forgery counts also means that the judge is
nevertheless statutorily required to impose a $200 special assessment fee,207
even though the judge has already decided that the defendant lacks the ability
to pay that exact amount. The logic of the special assessment scheme is
incongruous with the Court’s treatment of the historical sources informing the
Excessive Fines Clause. Most recently, in Timbs, the Court approvingly cited a
statement from Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England that “[n]o
man shall have a larger amercement imposed upon him, than his circumstances
or personal estate will bear.”208 In Browning-Ferris and Bajakajian, the Court
observed that the Eighth Amendment’s predecessor, the English Magna Carta,
constrained the government’s authority to impose fines by mandating that an
economic sanction “not be so large as to deprive [a person] of his livelihood.”209
While the Court did not specifically rule that a person’s livelihood is a
relevant consideration, these examples illustrate that the financial situation of a
defendant is not only relevant to the concept of proportionality itself, but that
a fine that is more than a defendant can pay may be properly understood as
excessive within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment. When a court decides
that a defendant cannot pay any amount of money on the basis of evidence

204. Id. § 5E1.2(d)(2)–(3).
205. Id. § 5E1.2(e) (emphasis added).
206. See id. § 5E1.2 (a)–(b) (allowing the judge to waive fines in limited circumstances).
207. 9A FED. PROC., L. ED. § 22:1753 (2021) (stating that an individual defendant convicted of a
felony is assessed a $100 special assessment fee for each count of conviction, so “multiple felonies [are]
subject to multiple assessments”).
208. Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 688 (2019) (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *379).
209. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 271 (1989); see also
United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 335 (1989).
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presented to the court, it conveys an understanding that even small economic
sanctions can inflict undue hardship to poor defendants and their family
members. For the reasons I develop below, mandating that a court impose a
special assessment fee that is unlikely to be collected defies logic, is at worst a
violation of a defendant’s Eighth Amendment rights, and at best an
administrative inefficiency on the courts.
2. Administering the Proposed Scheme
A special assessment scheme that allows judicial leeway in imposing the
fee would help to address the defects just mentioned. Such a scheme is desirable
not only because it would do more to safeguard the Eighth Amendment
protections against excessive fines that should be afforded to all defendants, but
also because it may potentially benefit the government’s purse. This idea might
at first seem implausible, since one goal of the special assessment statute is to
generate revenue (albeit “limited” revenue). Carrying the point further,
intuition suggests that a revenue-raising scheme requiring all defendants to pay
a fixed amount is more desirable than one where only some are required to pay.
The problem is that “[t]o the extent that states evaluate fee collection processes
at all, they seem to look at one side of the ledger—the money brought in—
without taking into account the costs of collection incurred by various
governmental entities.”210
Indeed, it is hardly clear that a mandatory special assessment scheme
advances the states’ interest in financing victims aids programs any better than
a discretionary one would. Rather, the evidence suggests the mandatory scheme
is at odds with the states’ interests on this front. To sharpen this point, consider
that a substantial amount of court resources are dedicated to overseeing
delinquent criminal justice debt.211 “[C]ourt dockets are often clogged by
hearings where courts require people with outstanding debt to appear
periodically, as well as hearings triggered when debtors fall behind on
payments.”212 Many people with legal financial obligations who lack the ability
to pay do not pay them. Acknowledging this precarity, one person burdened by
unmanageable LFOs put the point this way: “You know, there’s no way I can
pay it, so I don’t even think about, you know, one way or the other.”213
In light of this reality, it cannot be said with any confidence that “[t]he
adverse consequences of LFOs for those who possess them are . . . outweighed”
by the government collecting any outstanding fees.214 We cannot ignore the

210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

See, e.g., BANNON ET AL., supra note 193, at 11.
See id. (explaining hidden costs of delinquent debt collection).
Colgan, Graduating Economic Sanctions, supra note 17, at 70.
See BECKETT ET AL., CONSEQUENCES OF LFOS, supra note 38, at 46.
Id. at 5.
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reality that a person with a felony conviction215 is more likely to experience
severe financial hardship predating the violation.216 Compounding the hardship
is that a conviction erects barriers to housing,217 employment,218 and other
fixtures of a stable life.219 With few prospects for satisfying their LFOs, some
turn to extreme measures like forgoing necessary medical care or engaging in
criminal activity,220 erecting still more barriers to stability.
Thus, the more likely scenario is that the direct and indirect costs221 related
to collection of payments exceed the amount that would be deposited into the
crime victim funds—a counterproductive and wasteful outcome. While there is
no silver bullet for alleviating the destructive effects of poverty in the United
States, allowing judges to waive the imposition of special assessment on
defendants who cannot pay benefits victims, defendants, and the state.
C.

Critiques of a Discretionary Special Assessment Scheme

In the foregoing sections, I have argued that recalibrating the scheme for
imposing special assessment fees to allow for judicial discretion furnishes
greater Eighth Amendment protections to indigent defendants and is likely to
benefit the state. Even so, baseline concerns with the proposal exist. Consider
in this regard the following. There are well known arguments that penalty fees
215. In the spirit of affirming that people who have run afoul of the law are more than their worst
deeds, this Article avoids using the phrase “convicted felon” to describe people who have been
convicted of a felony.
216. Financial hardship is only one form of disadvantage more likely to be experienced by those
with criminal convictions. See BECKETT ET AL., CONSEQUENCES OF LFOS, supra note 38, at 38.
Others include “comparatively low levels of education attainment, high rates of unemployment” and
“mental and/or physical health problems.” Id.
217. See, e.g., Mark Walker, Finding a Home After Prison Tough for Released Felons, USA TODAY
(Feb. 28, 2015, 8:27 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/02/28/another-barrierprison-finding-home/24197429/ [https://perma.cc/32CU-297D] (last updated Feb. 28, 2015, 8:28 PM).
218. See, e.g., Amanda Agan & Sonja B. Starr, The Effect of Criminal Records on Access to Employment,
107 AM. ECON. REV. 560, 560 (2017).
219. Individuals with felony convictions also encounter challenges exercising their right to vote.
See, e.g., Tyler Knutson, Debts Paid: Ending Criminal Disenfranchisement, 46 J. LEGIS. 93, 93 (2019)
(“[S]tates have leveraged their constitutional powers to continually disenfranchise millions of voters
by modifying qualifications to vote and forbidding felons and ex-felons from participating in the
electoral process.”).
220. Colgan, Challenging the Modern Debtors’ Prison, supra note 17, at 8 (“Desperate to avoid these
repercussions, people go to extremes to pay. In an alarming number of cases people report having to
forego necessities like food, housing, hygiene, or medicine, in order to pay what little they can, even if
just a few dollars at a time.”).
221. An adjacent problem is that imposing unmanageable fees may also incentivize people to turn
towards crime to obtain the funds to satisfy the debt. See, e.g., Alexes Harris, Heather Evans &
Katherine Beckett, Drawing Blood from Stones: Legal Debt and Social Inequality in the Contemporary United
States, 115 AM. J. SOCIO. 1753, 1785 (2010). For example, one financially vulnerable individual trapped
in the cycle of criminal justice debt described their frustration: “I’m not trying or wanting to do any
crime, and I still can’t quite commit myself to do prostitution, but I think about it sometimes . . . at
least that way I could pay some of these damn fines.” Id.
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are instruments of accountability and that all lawbreakers should be held
accountable for any harms to society caused by their criminal conduct.222 So,
waiving the imposition of penalty fees on indigent defendants, the argument
maintains, would under-deter the poor.223
It is conceded that indigent defendants should be held accountable for
their wrongdoing.224 And poor defendants do not contend that they should
escape accountability for their actions simply because they are poor, as the
following observation relates: “I think it is fair, I think that if you break the law
like I did, there should be some . . . consequences for my behavior, and so I’m
trying . . . to be responsible in other areas of my life too.”225 But the notion that
income-based penalty fees might under-deter the poor rests on a faulty premise.
This notion assumes that poor people who commit crimes are driven to
break the law in the first instance by cost-benefit calculations about the severity
of the punishment they might receive. But closer inspection reveals a different
story. Studies show that persistent social and economic dislocation is
criminogenic.226 Poor people who break the law turn toward crime out of
desperation—the sort of impulse where rational calculations do not play a
prominent role. For those disadvantaged along multiple dimensions, the
withdrawal of opportunities engenders a survival impulse that leaves little room
for cost-benefit calculations about worst-case scenarios.227 James Baldwin put
222. See, e.g., Brittany Friedman & Mary Pattillo, Statutory Inequality: The Logics of Monetary
Sanctions in State Law, 5 RUSSELL SAGE FOUND. J. SOC. SCIS. 173, 175 (2019) (“Of course, the concept
of personal responsibility is not new in the criminal justice realm, where the law has always assumed
an individual actor who is individually culpable. . . . In the criminal justice context, the intensified
personal responsibility rhetoric allows for greater certainty of culpability and punitive severity.”); Gary
Blankenship, Senate Panel Reviews Fines and Fees, FLA. BAR: FLA. BAR NEWS (Nov. 13, 2019),
https://www.floridabar.org/the-florida-bar-news/senate-panel-reviews-fines-and-fees/ [https://perma.
cc/4ZUK-S4Q5] (reporting that Florida State Senator Jeff Brandes said “[convicted defendants]
brought it on themselves by committing a crime . . . . If they’re found guilty it seems reasonable to
have some kind of charge to them. If it were up to me, they’d pay the whole [cost]”).
223. Alec Schierenbeck, The Constitutionality of Income-Based Fines, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 1869, 1882
(2018).
224. See Beckett & Harris, supra note 35 and accompanying text.
225. BECKETT ET AL., CONSEQUENCES OF LFOS, supra note 38, at 45.
226. See Mirko Bagaric, Rich Offender, Poor Offender: Why It (Sometimes) Matters in Sentencing, 33
LAW & INEQ. 1, 36 (2015) (“[I]t is incontestable not only that the poor have a limited sphere of choice,
but also that it can induce a degree of frustration. Moreover, the poor are more inclined to commit
crime than the rich, because they do not have the same incentive to comply with the law in order to
maintain their own status.”); Stephen J. Morse, Deprivation and Desert, in FROM SOCIAL JUSTICE TO
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 114, 141–42 (William C. Heffernan & John Kleinig eds., 2000) (“A poor person
threatened with imminent death or starvation because he or she could not afford food or medicine
could justifiably take these items from another, conduct that would otherwise be larceny . . . .”).
227. Indeed, wealthy defendants are more likely to turn toward crime based on calculations about
the type of punishment they might receive. See, e.g., Alec Schierenbeck, A Billionaire and Nurse Shouldn’t
Pay the Same Fine for Speeding, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/15/
opinion/flat-fines-wealthy-poor.html [https://perma.cc/T882-QVM6 (dark archive)] (“Some evidence
shows the rich are more likely to break the law while driving.”).

99 N.C. L. REV. 1477 (2021)

1510

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 99

the point this way, “[i]f one is continually surviving the worst that life can bring,
one eventually ceases to be controlled by fear of what life can bring; whatever
it brings must be borne.”228
But this is not the end of the story. The argument that waiving economic
sanctions on the most financially vulnerable defendants might have an underdeterrent effect on those defendants also ignores the fact that special assessment
fees are often imposed “on top” of the sentence, i.e., an incarceratory term of
two years plus a special assessment fee, rather than as the sole punishment. And
the collateral consequences of convictions are on their own often more
debilitating than can be put in nominal terms.229 The typical person with a
felony conviction is relegated to a second-class existence.230 Barriers to
education, housing, employment, voting, and other paths that are staples of a
dignified life become the norm.231 Even if an economic sanction is not imposed,
the consequences of a conviction are still severe. Thus, the argument that
waiving special assessments on indigent defendants might have an underdeterrent effect on the poor does not carry the day.
Should skeptics be unsatisfied with the foregoing explanation, a more
creative approach to accountability may address their concerns. For example,
when a defendant’s financial circumstances counsel against the imposition of a
special assessment fee, their financial obligation to crime victims can be
converted into an obligation to perform community service work on behalf of
the population harmed by their criminal conduct. Requiring persons with
criminal convictions to fulfill community service obligations would not only
advance the states’ interest in supporting crime victims, but it also has the
potential to benefit defendants by integrating wrongdoers in productive,
dignity-affirming activities that are important to reducing recidivism.232

228. JAMES BALDWIN, THE FIRE NEXT TIME 106 (1963).
229. See, e.g., Michael Pinard, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Confronting Issues of
Race and Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 457, 533 (2010) (“The reality is that it is nearly impossible for
individuals convicted of criminal offenses to move past their criminal records because collateral
consequences continue to punish them long after the completion of their sentences.”).
230. See, e.g., David J. Zeitlin, Revisiting Richardson v. Ramirez: The Constitutional Bounds of ExFelon Disenfranchisement, 70 ALA. L. REV. 259, 290 (2018) (“[A] criminal sentence does not make an
individual irredeemable—once ex-felons have completed their sentences they have served their debt to
society and should be able to reintegrate without permanently being second-class citizens.”).
231. See Pinard, supra note 229, at 459 (“[I]ndividuals [with criminal convictions] must confront a
wide range of collateral consequences stemming from their convictions, including ineligibility for
federal welfare benefits, public housing, student loans, and employment opportunities, as well as
various forms of civic exclusion, such as ineligibility for jury service and felon disenfranchisement.”).
232. The collateral consequences of obtaining a criminal record are dignity-stripping. See id. at
522. Enhancing the “dignity of individuals with criminal records” is an important step in rehabilitation
so that they can live productive lives. Id. at 464. This can be accomplished by affording individuals
with criminal records the opportunity to engage in productive activities in the community. See id. at
464–65.
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One might also object to the proposed scheme on the ground that tying
the imposition of special assessment fees to defendants’ ability to pay is a
“redistributionist policy masquerading as criminal justice reform.”233 Put
differently, a logical outgrowth of tethering the imposition of special
assessments to a defendant’s financial status is that wealthy people will be left
to shoulder the responsibility of financing the victims aid programs. That the
scheme might have a redistributionist effect breaks no new ground and is not
an argument that should stand in the way of the proposed reform. It is already
the practice in many courts to undertake ability to pay calculations before
imposing fines other than special assessment fees. The Supreme Court has
acknowledged that trial judges can proportion economic sanctions other than
special assessments according to a defendant’s ability to pay. In such instances,
doing so would not be a constitutional mandate, but an exercise in sound
discretion.234 This indicates that economic justice concerns are on their own
principled legal bases for gradations in monetary penalty. In short, the evidence
is compelling that tethering the imposition of special assessments to the
imposition of other fines has the potential to improve the overall financial
standing of the government, which should mitigate concerns that the wealthy
are shouldering any unwarranted responsibility.235
Still others might critique the scheme on the theory that its
administrability and cost make it impractical.236 The opposite is true. A special
assessment scheme allowing judicial leeway is feasible from an administrative
and cost perspective. As an initial matter, to bring this scheme to life, § 3013
would have to be amended to give judges a free hand to waive the imposition
of special assessments. There are reasons to think that Congress would be open
to amending the statute along these lines. Lawmakers are “increasingly
conducive to adopting policies allowing for the graduation of economic
sanctions according to ability to pay.”237 Coalitions involving liberal
organizations such as the American Civil Liberties Union, conservative groups
233. Schierenbeck, supra note 32, at 1879.
234. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 22 (1973).
235. See, e.g., Colgan, Graduating Economic Sanctions, supra note 17, at 65.
236. For instance, in Williams v. Illinois, Chief Justice Burger noted that the Court was “not
unaware that today’s holding [that it is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause to convert
involuntarily unpaid fines into incarceration beyond a statutory maximum] may place a further
burden on States in administering criminal justice.” 399 U.S. 235, 245 (1970). A 2019 report by
the Brennan Center for Justice also found rampant inefficiency in the collection and enforcement
of fines and fees, and recommended that “[s]tates and localities should pass legislation to
eliminate court-imposed fees” in order to address these administrative burdens. Matthew Menendez,
Michael F. Crowley, Lauren-Brooke Eisen & Noah Atchison, The Steep Costs of Criminal Justice Fees
and Fines: A Fiscal Analysis of Three States and Ten Counties, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. 5 (Nov. 21,
2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2020-07/2019_10_Fees%26Fines_Final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UP2A-E8V4].
237. Colgan, Graduating Economic Sanctions, supra note 17, at 60.
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like American Legislative Exchange Council, and nonpartisan organizations like
the Conference of State Court Administrators are coaelescing around the issue
of “the graduation of economic sanctions to account for a defendant’s ability to
pay.”238 In view of the intervening developments since § 3013 was enacted in
1984, reforming the use of criminal justice fines by amending the special
assessment statute is an idea that can gain traction in Congress.
From a cost perspective, the proposed recalibration would not impose
additional burdens on the courts. As already noted, ability-to-pay calculations
are a common practice in criminal sentencing proceedings. Probation officers
in the federal system dedicate considerable resources to developing a presentence investigation report (“PSR”) on the “defendant’s history and
characteristics, including . . . the defendant’s financial condition.”239 Trial
judges adopt the findings in PSRs to differentiate between defendants240 and
make factual determinations about what punishment should be imposed.241 The
existing infrastructure in federal courts for determining a defendant’s ability to
pay demonstrates that the special assessment scheme contemplated can be
adopted in a straightforward fashion that would not require additional capacity.
CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that one straightforward but underappreciated way
to reform the system is to recalibrate the scheme for imposing special
assessments. Specifically, when a judge has determined that a defendant lacks
the ability to pay any fine, the special assessment should be waived. This
approach provides stronger Eighth Amendment protections for indigent
defendants and comports with current sentencing practices. In light of the
perverse consequences of unmanageable criminal justice debt on indigent
defendants (including the trickle-down effects on their families and
communities)242 and the administrative inefficiencies inherent in overseeing
debt that is unlikely to be collected, the status quo special assessment fee
structure is in need of reform. Defendants who cannot pay, will not pay. But
the cost of collecting an outstanding debt the size of typical special assessment
238. Id.
239. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d)(2)(A).
240. See Note, A Proposal to Ensure Accuracy in Presentence Investigation Reports, 91 YALE L.J. 1225,
1225 (1982) (“The Presentence Investigation Report (PSI) is the primary source of such information
for all stages of the correctional process.”).
241. Id.
242. KARIN MARTIN & KIMBERLY SPENCER-SUAREZ, THE FORTUNE SOC’Y, JOHN JAY COLL.
OF CRIM. JUST., CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT: COSTS & CONSEQUENCES 8 (2017), https://issuu.com/
thefortunesociety/docs/cj_report_/8 [https://perma.cc/F8T5-TWCL] (“Because the burden of
indebtedness frequently extends beyond the debtor, at stake is the potential for this debt to add an
additional stressor to families, many of whom may already be struggling financially. This, ultimately,
is yet another cost to both family and community.”).
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fees is likely to be a net loss to the government’s purse. Instead, a more desirable
scheme would be to waive the penalty fee and/or convert indigent defendants’
financial obligations to an obligation to perform community service work
benefitting groups impacted by the type of crime involved.
APPENDIX
The chart below provides the results of a study conducted by this author
involving 112 federal criminal cases across the country where defendants were
deemed at sentencing to be poor to pay a fine. For a broad cross section of
practices throughout the country, the study reviewed cases from every circuit
court of appeals. The results showed that prosecutors waive special assessment
fees less than twenty percent of the time when a judge has already determined
that the defendant is too poor to pay a fine.
The breakdown of the study was as follows: Of the ten such cases from the
First Circuit Court of Appeals, prosecutors did not waive the special assessment
in any of the cases. From the nine Second Circuit cases reviewed, that number
was zero. All of the ten reviewed Third Circuit cases yielded the same result.
Of ten such cases from the Fourth Circuit, only one prosecutor moved to have
special assessment fees waived, which was granted by the court. In the Fifth
Circuit, out of ten cases, six prosecutors moved for special assessment fees, but
only in four of those cases were those motions granted or the fees remitted by
the government. No U.S. Attorneys arguing in the Sixth Circuit moved for
special assessment fees to be waived out of ten reviewed cases. In the Seventh
Circuit, of ten comparable cases, two motions were made for special assessment
fees to be waived, both of which were granted. In the Eighth and Ninth Circuits,
chances of special assessment fees being waived were significantly higher: in ten
of ten reviewed Eighth Circuit cases, prosecutors moved for waiver of fees and
each motion was granted by the court, while in the Ninth Circuit, ten of ten
reviewed cases involved such motions and only one was denied. The Tenth and
Eleventh Circuits, however, did not consider a single special assessment fee
waiver motion, out of ten reviewed cases each. Similarly, in the D.C. Circuit,
zero prosecutors in the three reviewed cases moved to waive special assessment
fees.
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2:10-cr00884
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W.D. Pa.

3d

Yes

No

W.D. Pa.

3d

Yes

No

W.D. Pa.

3d

Yes

No

W.D. Pa.

3d

Yes

No

W.D. Pa.

3d

Yes

No

N.D. W.
Va.

4th

Yes

No

E.D.N.C.

4th

Yes

No

4th

Yes

No

4th

Yes

No

E.D. Va.

4th

Yes

No

N.D. W.
Va.

4th

Yes

No

E.D.N.C.

4th

Yes

No

E.D. Va.

4th

Yes

Yes

N.D. W.
Va.

4th

Yes

No

E.D. Va.

4th

Yes

No

W.D. Tex.

5th

Yes

No

S.D. Miss.

5th

Yes

No

S.D. Tex.

5th

Yes

Yes

S.D. Tex.

5th

Yes

No

S.D. Tex.

5th

Yes

No

S.D. Tex.

5th

Yes

No

S.D. Tex.

5th

Yes

Yes

S.D. W.
Va.
S.D. W.
Va.
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S.D. Tex.

5th

Yes

No

W.D. Tex.

5th

Yes

Yes

S.D. Tex.

5th

Yes

No

S.D. Ohio

6th

Yes

No

S.D. Ohio

6th

Yes

No

W.D.
Mich.

6th

Yes

No

N.D. Ohio

6th

Yes

No

S.D. Ohio

6th

Yes

No

E.D.
Mich.

6th

Yes

No

S.D. Ohio

6th

Yes

No

S.D. Ohio

6th

Yes

No
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6th

Yes
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Yes

No

N.D. Ind.
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C.D. Ill.
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Yes
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N.D. Ind.
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Yes
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N.D. Ind.
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Yes
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N.D. Ind.

7th

Yes
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N.D. Ind.

7th

Yes
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N.D. Ind.

7th

Yes
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C.D. Ill.

7th

Yes
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N.D. Ind.

7th

Yes

No
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7th

Yes

Yes

E.D. Ark.

8th

Yes

Yes

E.D. Ark.

8th

Yes

Yes

E.D. Ark.

8th

Yes

Yes

S.D. Tex.

8th

Yes

No

D.S.D.

8th

Yes

No

D. Minn.

8th

Yes

No

D. Neb.

8th

Yes

No

W.D. Ark.

8th

Yes

No

W.D. Ark.

8th

Yes

No

W.D. Ark.

8th

Yes

No

D. Ariz

9th

Yes

Yes

D. Ariz

9th

Yes

Yes

D. Ariz
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Yes

Yes

D. Ariz
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Yes

D. Ariz
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Yes

E.D. Cal.
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Yes
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D. Colo.

10th

Yes

No

D. Colo.

10th

Yes

No

D. Colo.

10th

Yes

No

D. Colo.

10th

Yes

No

D. Colo.

10th

Yes
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W.D.
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S.D. Ala.

11th

Yes

No

S.D. Ala.

11th

Yes

No

N.D. Ala.

11th

Yes

No

N.D. Ga.

11th

Yes

No

M.D. Fla.

11th

Yes

No

S.D. Fla.

11th

Yes

No

S.D. Ala.

11th

Yes

No

S.D. Ala.

11th

Yes

No

N.D. Ga.

11th

Yes

No

D.D.C.

D.C.

Yes

No

D.D.C.

D.C.

Yes

No

99 N.C. L. REV. 1477 (2021)

2021]
United States v.
Destine
United States v.
Segovia

NICKELS AND DIMES?
1:08-cr00126
1:08-cr00018

1519

D.D.C.
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Yes

No

D.D.C.
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No
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